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"If plaintiff, through negligence in not properly presenting her
claim in the first instance, has lost her right to recover money which
she allegedly advanced in reliance upon fraudulent representations
of said individual defendants, it is a hardship but one from which
the courts cannot relieve if the general and well-established rule
against the splitting of a single cause of action is to be allowed for
the benefit of all."*
SUCH quotations as this, where the operation was a success but the
patient died, arouse the suspicion in connection with the rule of res
judicata that the courts protest too much. The reasoning is more than
vaguely reminiscent of a common-law judge ruling against some de-
serving party who had followed a course designed to threaten the sym-
metry of common-law pleading. When courts pretty consistently feel
called upon to apologize to a litigant while administering the ldss of
death to his cause, perhaps some basic reconsideration of the reasons
is overdue.
The landmarks are familiar." Defendant may continue to sleep in
plaintiff's bed, though not under plaintiff's bed-quilts.2 Defendant may
continue to occupy plaintiff's real estate even though plaintiff has a
judgment awarding him possession. 3 The insurance company need not
pay the widow all it owes her.4 Small wonder that apologies are in
order.
Traditionally the res judicata problem has been solved by defini-
tion. Once a cause of action "5 was defined, then anything that could
be squeezed within the confines of the particular definition inevitably
acquired certain characteristics and was attended with certain conse-
t Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Lay,.
*Wulfjen v. Dolton, 24 Cal.2d 891, 896, 151 P.2d 846, 849 (1944).
1. Citations throughout are for the most part merely illustrative. No attempt has
been made to count cases. For the sake of brevity, the problem is approached from the
plaintiff's point of view. Similar considerations, however, will prevail as to defendants.
2. Farrington v. Payne, 15 Johns. 432 (N.Y. 1818).
3. Hahl v. Sugo, 169 N.Y. 109, 62 N.E. 135 (1901).
4. Jacobson v. Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n, 11 N.WV2d 442 (N.D. 1943).
5. Whenever the term "cause of action" is used in this paper, the reader should
assume that it is in quotation marks.
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quences, as day follows night. The effort to evolve a satisfactory de-
finition of a cause of action has produced some of the finest examples
of the possibilities for philosophical development in the field of proce-
dure. The scholarly products of those who have already plowed the
ground leave little for the latecomer to do, unless perchance he may
be able to raise a different crop out of the same soil.
Professor McCaskill and Judge Clark are the leading exponents of
the two rival schools of thought, and their views are familiar to all
students of the subject. Adopting the old common-law remedies as a
measuring stick, Professor McCaskill defines a cause of action as
"that group of operative facts which, standing alone, would show
a single right in the plaintiff and a single delict to that right giving
cause for the state, through its courts, to afford relief to the party or
parties whose right was invaded." 6
Judge Clark, on the contrary, says a cause of action is
"such an aggregate of operative facts as will give rise to at least one
right of action, but it is not limited to a single right (if it is ever pos-
sible to isolate one such right from others). The extent of the cause
is to be determined pragmatically by the court. . . but the con-
trolling factor will be the matter of trial convenience. . . ." 7
Essentially the difference has centered around the size of a cause of
action. Professor McCaskill favors a small-sized cause of action be-
cause, for one reason, it restricts the operation of the doctrine of res
judicata. Any desired increase in the scope and content of a law suit
may be obtained through more flexible rules for joining parties and
causes of action, rather than by increasing the size of the cause of ac-
tion itself. Judge Clark favors a big cause of action because that in-
creases the scope and content of a law suit, and he is willing to allow
lawyers and litigants to learn the resulting harsher rules of res judicata
by trial and error in the hard school of experience." This lets more
angels sit on the head of the pin at one time. The strange thing is that
6. McCaskill, Actions and Causes of Action, 34 YALE L, J. 614, 638 (1925).
7. CLARic, CODE PLEADING 137 (2d ed. 1947). Other articles in the field are Harris,
What is a Cause of Action?, 16 CALF. L. REv. 459 (1928); Gavit, The Code Cause of
Action: Joinder and Counterclaims, 30 COL. L. REv. 802 (1930); Arnold, The Code
"Catse of Action" Clarified by the United States Supreme Court, 19 A.B.A.J. 215 (1933);
Wheaton, The Code "Cause of Action": Its Definition, 22 CORN. L. Q. 1 (1936); Mc-
Caskill, The Elusive Cause of Action, 4 U. oF Cm. L. REv. 281 (1937); Schopflocher,
What is a Single Cause of Action for the Purpose of the Doctrine of Res Judieata?, 21
Oma L. REv. 319 (1942). It is mainly a question of choosing up sides.
8. Judge Clark, dissenting in Riordan v. Ferguson, 147 F.2d 983, 988 (C.C.A. 2d
1945), says, "The small chance nowadays that an action may ultimately go wrong for
mere procedural defects should induce greater confidence in the judgment ultimately




the literature has centered so largel yon the definition and not upon
the effect. Deciding cases by definition is easy and therefore a method
which courts are prone to follow, but the easy way is not necessarily the
best way.
Judges, scholars and statute-writers use the phrase "cause of action"
in a variety of situations. Statutes commonly provide that the venue
of a case may be where the cause of action or some part thereof arose.0
Codes and practice acts require that causes of action be stated sepa-
rately.'0 An amendment to a complaint tendered after the running of
the statute of limitations raises the question whether it is being at-
tempted to introduce a new cause of action which has been barred by
the statute of limitations." The statute of limitations itself raises the
question when did the cause of action accrue, as that was the time when
the statute commenced to run. Provisions on joining causes of action
range from those allowing limited joinder only of causes of action falling
within the same certain classification, -1 2 to unlimited joinder if the
parties otherwise are properly before the court.13 A complaint usually
is required to state a cause of action. 4 The rule of res judicata, herein
discussed, forbids the relitigation of a cause of action once litigated and
even of matters not litigated at all if they are part of a cause of action
which once was litigated in part.
A "liberal" attitude on amendments, after the running of the statute
of limitations, i.e. liberal in the sense of stretching procedural concepts
so as to allow an apparently deserving plaintiff to recover, leads to the
definition of a cause of action in terms of bigness, thus permitting the
conclusion that the matter included in the amendment was really a
part of the original cause of action and therefore no new cause of action
is being introduced.15 The same definition applied in a res judicata
situation lets the plaintiff recover his bedding in one action but not his
bed in another action, because he has split his cause of action, which
included the conversion of both bed and bedding, for both of which he
could have recovered in one action since both were converted by the
same wrongful act of defendant."6 Can a definition of a cause of action
be phrased so as to be all things to all men, producing a happy result in
9. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. Act § 184.
10. N.C. Gzw. STAT. § 1-123 (Michie, 1943).
11. Compare Box v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 107 Iowva 660, 78 NA. 694 (1899),
with Chobanian v. Washburn Wire Co., 33 R.I. 289, 80 AUt. 394 (1911).
12. See note 10 supra.
13. ILL. Civ. PRA C. Act § 44.
14. N.Y. Crv. PRac. AcT § 255.
15. In Illinois it was found necessary entirely to abandon the term "cause of action"
in dealing with amendments after the running of the statute of limitations and instead to
use "transaction or occurrence" in order to achieve liberality as to such amendments. Iri.
Crv. PRAc. Act, § 46(2) ; ILT. Civ. PnAc. Acr AnNo. 112 (McCaskill, 1933).
16. Farrington v. Payne, 15 Johns. 432 (N.Y. 1818).
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every situation where the concept of a cause of action may appear? Or
ought we be prepared to abandon the idea that procedural problems
lend themselves to solution by definition? Classification may be neces-
sary if a body of knowledge is to be put to work, but legal hardening of
the arteries results when classification becomes an end in itself and orig-
inal objectives are lost from view.
THE RULE OF RES JUDICATA
Res judicata is an ancient rule, originally traveling as "estoppel"
until the current phrase was adopted from the civil law and put into
common use. 7 A typical statement of the rule is:
" . .. if the first suit was between the same parties and involved
the same cause of action, the judgment in the former suit is conclu-
sive, not only as to all questions actually decided but as to all ques-
tions which might properly have been litigated and determined in
that action." 18
The rule, then, falls into two divisions: (a) what was in fact determined
in the former action, and (b) what might have been determined in the
former action.
The first part of the rule, involving the ascertainment of what was
in fact determined in the former action, presents no great difficulty,
either practical or theoretical. Courts embark daily upon such inquiries
when the question is one of what is usually called estoppel by verdict,
or to use a newer phraseology, "collateral estoppel by judgment," 19
under the related rule that when a matter, usually of fact but sometimes
of law, is once decided between the parties to an action then that deter-
mination is binding in a subsequent suit where that particular matter
is again in issue between the same parties, even though the cause of
action is not the same. Here we find the courts limiting the rule most
scrupulously to what was in fact litigated and decided in the former
proceeding, and for that purpose referring to pleadings, testimony, jury
instructions, findings, verdicts and any other pertinent source of infor-
mation sensibly helpful to the inquiry.20 Unless it does affirmatively
appear that the matter was actually raised and passed upon, then it
may be litigated in the case now on trial. 21 The inquiry is factual and
17. BLACic, LAW OF JUDGMENTS 760-1 (2d ed. 1902). See generally Von Moschzisker,
Res .Tudicata, 38 YALE L. J. 299 (1929).
18. City of Elmhurst v. Kegerries, 392 Ill. 195, 203, 64 N.E.2d 450, 453 (1946).
19. Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Juvdgment, 56 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1942).
20. Wolfson v. Northern States Management Co., 22 N.W.2d 545 (Minn. 1946).
21. E.g., Ohio Life Insurance Co. v. Board of Education, 387 Ill. 159, 55 N.E.2d 163
(1944), where plaintiff in a former action had obtained judgment in the federal district
court for interest due on bonds. Subsequently plaintiff sued in the state court for the
principal of the bonds and was met with the defense of invalidity of the statute purporting
to validate the bond issue. The court pointed out that while the complaint in the first case
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common-sense. The might-have-beens are left strictly out of the pic-
ture.
When we come to the second part of the rule, dealing with what
might have been litigated in the former action, however, we leave the
workaday world and enter into a wondrous realm of words, where re-
sults are obtained not by grubbing out facts but by the application of
incantations which change pumpkins into coaches and one man's prop-
erty into another's. The incantations are the various definitions of
what constitutes a cause of action. If the cause of action in the second
action was a part of the cause of action in the first action, plaintiff can-
not recover. He has had his day in court, even though the subject
matter of the second proceeding was not even mentioned in the first
one.
The problem essentially is one of splitting up the underlying situation
which gives rise to litigation, and using the pieces to build more than
one lawsuit. The splitting may be as to the theory of recovery; it may
be along arithmetical lines; or it may involve the relief given.
Splitting as to theory of recovery occurs when plaintiff in his first
action adopts one rule of substantive law, supported by an appropriate
selection of the facts comprising the underlying situation out of which
the litigation arose, while in his second action he changes his rule of
substantive law or his selection of appropriate facts, or both, although
the underlying situation remains the same. For example: In a personal
injury case, plaintiff sues first for one kind of negligence, and in his
second action on a theory of willful wanton misconduct, or for a dif-
ferent kind of negligence, the same accident being involved in each
case.
22
What may be called "arithmetical" splitting occurs when plaintiff,
more or less arbitrarily according to the circumstances, selects certain
elements of damages for his first action and others for his second action,
all having some basic connection. Examples are: More than one action
based upon separate breaches of the same contract.2 More than one
action based on the conversion or destruction of various items of prop-
erty by one wrongful act.24 Plaintiff sues only for the face amount of
a life insurance policy and in a second action seeks to recover an addi-
tional amount for the annual increase in benefits stipulated in the pol-
icy.25 Plaintiff brings one action to recover for personal injuries and
relied upon the validating statute, no question was actually raised as to its validity and
judgment was entered upon the assumption that the statute vras valid. Estoppel was held
not to apply.
22. Cotter v. Boston and Northern Street Ry., 190 Mass. 302, 76 N.E. 910 (1906).
23. Pakas v. Hollingshead, 184 N.Y. 211, 77 N.E. 40 (1906).
24. Farrington v. Payne, 15 Johns 432 (N.Y. 1818).
25. Jacobson v. Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Assn, 11 N.W2d 442 (N.D. 1943).
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another to recover for property damage arising out of the same negli-
gent act of defendant.
21
Splitting of relief occurs when plaintiff fails to ask for or obtain in
his first action all the relief to which he might have been entitled, and
brings another action for additional relief. Examples are: In an action
for the possession of real property plaintiff obtains a judgment for pos-
session, but fails to obtain a decree requiring defendant to remove an
obstruction of such nature that the sheriff cannot be compelled to re-
move it. In a subsequent proceeding plaintiff seeks a decree compelling
defendant to remove the obstructionY Plaintiff forecloses a mortgage
but fails to obtain a deficiency decree which he might have had. Later
he brings an action for a money judgment for the deficiency.
2
In each instance the plaintiff is met with the defense of res judicata.
The grounds commonly advanced to justify the rule of res judicata
are: 1. The danger of double recovery; 2. The desirability of stable
judicial determinations; 3. Relieving a defendant of the expense and
vexation of repeated litigation; 4. Economy of court time. A fair ap-
praisal of the validity of solving res judicata problems in terms of causes
of action involves considering each of these four grounds in relation to
splitting theory, splitting arithmetically and splitting relief.
DANGER OF DOUBLE RECOVERY
The danger of double recovery obviously exists only in the event the
plaintiff has recovered in his first action. If he was successful, then a
careful examination of what elements of damages or injury were con-
sidered and passed upon should furnish an ample safeguard against
further recovery based upon the same elements in the later action. The
inquiry is no more difficult than in the case of estoppel by verdict or
"collateral estoppel by judgment."
An illustration at common law is the case of a trespass with an ag-
gravation where plaintiff might have an action of trespass for the tres-
pass itself and an action on the case for the matters constituting the
aggravation, or at his option might bring an action of trespass and in-
clude the additional matter as an aggravation of the trespass." If,
after bringing trespass, he later sued in case, an examination in some
detail of the proceedings in the first case would readily reveal whether
the circumstances attending the trespass had been placed before the
jury and therefore presumably did or did not enter into the verdict10
26. King v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 80 Minn. 83, 82 N.W. 1113 (1900). Cf.
Vasu v. Kohlers, Inc., 145 Ohio St. 321, 61 N.E.2d 707 (1945).
27. Hahl v. Sugo, 169 N.Y. 109, 62 N.E. 135 (1901).
28. Kearny County Bank v. Nunn, 156 Kan. 563, 134 P.2d 635 (1943).
29. McCaskill, The Ehuive' Cause of Action, 4 U. oF CHL L. Rsv. 281, 294 (1937).
30. Savage v. French, 13 Ill. App. 17 (1883). At common law merely shifting as to
the form of the action did not avoid the operation of res judicata, when plaintiff had al-
[Vol. 57: 339
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A recent example of such an inquiry appears in Smith v. Lykes Bros.-
Ripley S.S. Co., 3- where an injured seaman based his first action upon
negligence under the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 and hs second ac-
tion upon the general maritime law for failure to provide maintenance
and cure. The court held that the first action was not res judicata of
the second but that plaintiff was not entitled to recover twvice for the
same elements of damage. "The issue is whether or not the items of
damage here involved were actually litigated and determined in the
former case .... What items of damage were really submitted to the
jury may be proven aliunde by evidence not contradictory of the rec-
ord." 32
A similar question was presented in Ash v. Jorensen.33 Plaintiff
first recovered judgment for personal injuries in a negligence action
against an automobile driver. This judgment was satisfied, and plain-
tiff later brought a malpractice action against the physician who at-
tended her. The court ruled that, while plaintiff upon proof of due care
in selecting a physician might have recovered her entire damages from
the original defendant, she would not be obliged to do so. Here again
the inquiry was what plaintiff actually placed before the jury as dam-
ages in the original action, rather than what she might have employed
as a basis of recovery.
Whether plaintiff's splitting has been of theory, or arithmetical, or
of relief seems to be unimportant in connection with double recovery.
The essential inquiry is whether he has already had redress for a par-
ticular element of damages or injury. Any doubt should be resolved
against plaintiff, as he could have avoided the raising of the question
by including the debated matter in his first action.
DESIRABILITY OF STABLE DECISIoNs
Effective operation of courts in the social and economic scheme re-
quires that their decisions have the respect of and be observed bythe
parties, the general public and the courts themselves. According in-
sufficient weight to prior decisions encourages disrespect and disregard
of courts and their decisions and invites litigation. However, giving
a prior decision effect beyond its actual scope is just as undesirable as
according to it an insufficient effect.
ready recovered for the same elements of damages. Compare Gilchrist v. Bale, 8 %V. & S.
355 (Pa. 1839), where plaintiff's former recovery in trespass for criminal conversation
with his wife was held to bar a later action on the case for enticing her away, uith
Schriver v. Eckenrode, 87 Pa. St. 213 (1878), holding that a prior unsuccessful action
for deceit did not bar a subsequent recovery for breach of warranty that a tract of land
contained a specified acreage.
31. 105 F.2d 604 (C.C.A. 5th 1939).
32. Id. at 606.
33. 24 Cal.2d 654, 150 P.2d 876 (1944).
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Pronouncements that courts will not pass upon particular matters
because of a highly conceptual view of what might have been decided
in a prior action serve neither to enhance the stature of courts nor to
add strength to the foundations upon which they rest. Too frequently
the solution of res judicata problems is reminiscent of the old vaudeville
skit in which 'two men owned a cow. One killed his half and the other
half died.
The stability of decisions is not affected when plaintiff splits his
cause of action, arithmetically, or spilts his relief. The prior decision
remains in full force and is not questioned. Plaintiff merely wants some-
thing additional. A split of theory, on the other hand, presents a very
real problem. Policy would seem to indicate that when a plaintiff has
once attempted to obtain his entire relief, based upon his entire dam.
ages, then the matter should be laid at rest. He should be denied a
second attempt at substantially the same objective under a different
guise. In deciding such cases, the concept of a cause of action possesses
real utility if applied with realization of what actually is at issue and
with due regard for the other factors herein discussed.
FREEDOM FROM VExATIous LITIGATION
The elimination of vexatious litigation sounds like a worthy purpose.
But what is meant by vexatious litigation? Presumably all lawsuits
vex the defendant by causing him anxiety and expense, even if he wins.
Since our object clearly is not the elimination of all lawsuits, then it
must be the elimination of those which are vexatious for some particular
reason or reasons. Under the res judicata decisions, cases involving the
danger of double recovery or really threatening the stability of judicial
decisions, already discussed, might be classed as vexatious. However,
the term seems primarily to be directed against a plaintiff who tries to
make two actions do the work of one, by splitting his cause of action
arithmetically or by splitting his relief.
Here it is important to distinguish compulsory joinder from permis-
sive joinder of the subject matter of litigation. A literal reading of the
rule that res judicata applies not only to what was litigated but to what
might have been litigated, as well, would mean that all procedurally
joinable matters between the parties at the time of the former action
would now be res judicata, regardless of how unrelated such matters
might be in fact. Courts have not gone to that length. They have said
that what might have been litigated in the first action is res judicata
only to the extent that it constituted a part of the cause of action in-
volved in the first action. If the causes of action are different, it is im-
material then that plaintiff might have joined them under rules govern-
ing permissive joindet.34 Now the purpose of liberality in joinder rules
34. Boddiker v. McPartlin, 379 IMI. 567, 41 N.E.2d 756 (1942).
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is the same as the anti-vexatious-litigation purpose of the rule of res
judicata, i.e. to encourage litigants to reduce the numerical volume of
lawsuits by bringing more disputed matters into the same action. Yet
when plaintiff seeks to make two lawsuits do the work of one, the rule
of res judicata applies too harsh a penalty (complete loss of plaintiff's
right of recovery), and permissive joinder too slight a penalty (some
added inconvenience and expense to plaintiff, which he incurs volun-
tarily). And so we find a deserving plaintiff denied recovery of very
apparent damages for breach of contract because the contract was "en-
tire", and in a former action he had not included damages for antici-
patory breach,35 thus "splitting his cause of action," 'while in another
case plaintiff is permitted to bring as many actions as he holds bonds
and coupons of the same identical issue, because each bond and cou-
pon "constitutes a separate cause of action."
The suggestion has been made that parties should be compelled to
join all joinable matters, regardless of whether they are part of the
same "cause of action," and that failure to do so be punished with sen-
tence of death by res judicata as to any omitted matter.3 A step in that
direction appears in the compulsory counterclaim provision of the fed-
eral rules.3 1 Applied generally, however, the penalty is a severe one for
mere procedural failure. Too much virtue is often ascribed to extremely
liberal joinder provisions, as joinder of wholly unrelated matters usually
effects no saving except of paper and filing fees and results as a practical
matter in breaking the case back down into some sort of units for pur-
poses of trial.
Assuming that sound policy encourages joinder of related matters, a
litigant who has split his cause of action arithmetically or as to relief
should be penalized to the extent that the splitting has resulted in
added expense to the opposing party. The same principle, however,
should apply in the case of the plaintiff who brings separate actions
upon related causes of actions which can more economically be tried
in one proceeding, e.g., cases where consolidation may be had under
present rules if the actions are pending at the same time in the same
court. Recoverable expenses should include court costs, counsel fees
and other expenses, such as expert witnesses, to the extent that such
expenses are increased by the use of more than one action. Thus the
desired objective of gathering all related matters into one action may
be achieved by the assessment of costs, more effectively than under
optional joinder rules and less harshly than under res judicata. 2
35. Pakas v. Hollingshead, 184 N.Y. 211, 77 N.E. 40 (1906).
36. Nesbit v. Riverside District, 144 U.S. 610 (1892) ; Gaddis v. Williams, 193 Pac.
483 (Okla. 1921).
37. Wheaton, Causes of Action Blended, 22 ]Mmz. L. REv. 498 (1938).
38. FED. R. Crv. P. 13(a).
39. See the interesting discussion in Vasu v. Kohiers, Inc., 145 Ohio St. 321, 61
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Contrary to the English practice, tradition in this country has al-
most uniformly been opposed to the assessment of counsel fees against
an opposing party. No matter how unfounded an alleged cause of
action may be, no matter how ironclad the defense, usually the sole
penalty for frivolous litigation is payment of court costsA0 The prev-
alence of contingent fees even relieves the unsuccessful plaintiff of the
necessity of paying his own attorney fees. We find, however, an increas-
ing tendency in the contrary direction, with rules for the assessment of
attorney fees and other expenses as costs 'for unreasonably increasing
the expense of some particular aspect of the litigation.4' An extension
into the fields now occupied by the rule against splitting causes of action
and by permissive joinder could produce very salutary results.
ECONOMY OF COURT TIME
The final justification of the usual rule of res judicata, the saving in
court time, is peculiarly unconvincing. Courts exist for the purpose of
trying lawsuits. If the courts are too busy to decide cases fairly and on
the merits, something is wrong. Decision solely in terms of the con-
venience of the court approaches the theory that the individual exists
for the state. Maintenance of the judicial system is a very minor por-
'tion of the cost of government.42 If the judges are too few to be able
to decide cases fairly and on the merits, the public probably can afford
to have more judges. The fact that a party may waive the defense of
res judicata, 4 as seems to be the general rule, indicates that saving the
N.E.2d 707 (1945), an automobile case involving personal injury and property damage
with insurance as to the latter, and note the situation arising when different insurers in-
sure against different items of liability arising from the same injury, as in Brinkman v.
Oil Transfer Corp., 185 Misc. 257, 56 N.Y.S.2d 773 (Sup. Ct. 1945). The difficulties of
apportioning recovery in such cases if the cause of action is held to be an indivisible unit
is illustrated by Hayward v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 212 Minn. 500, 4 N.W.2d
316 (1942).
Attention should be directed to the declaratory judgment acts, which permit and
even encourage plaintiffs to split their relief. For example, the Illinois act provides,
"Where further relief based upon a declaration of right shall become necessary or
proper after such declaration has been made, application may be made. . . to show cause
why such further relief should not be granted forthwith...." Iu.. CIV. PRAe. AcT
§ 57Y2(3).
40. Ritter v. Ritter, 381 Ill. 549, 46 N.E.2d 41 (1943) (refusing recovery for attorney
fees incurred).
41. Under FED. R. Civ. P. 37, refusal to answer an interrogatory without substantial
justification may be penalized by assessment of expenses, including attorney fees, against
the offending party. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 56(g) involving affidavits in bad faith in
summary judgment proceedings; ILL, Civ. PRAe. AcT § 41 involving allegations and
denials made without reasonable cause and not in good faith and found to be untrue; and
Illinois Rule 18 dealing with unreasonable refusals to make admissions.
42. Editorial, "Cost of Our Federal Courts," 33 A.B.A.J. 802 (1947), places the cost
of the entire federal judicial organization at $20 million.
43. CLARK, op. cit. supra note 7, at 479. Note, 23 CALin. L. Rav. 205 (1935). See
Von Moschzisker, supra note 17.
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judge's time is more afterthought than reason. Judge Sibley's com-
ment, dissenting in United States v. C.C. Clark, IRc., 44 although directed
primarily against the government, would seem equally applicable to
the courts:
"It is more for the public good that the United States Government
in its own courts should deal honorably with its taxpayers than that
a few hours of court time should be saved." '
CONCLUSION
The courts themselves have not been happy over results often ap-
parently required by res judicata. Even Judge Clark is forced to admit:
"The defense of res judicata is universally respected, but actually
not very well liked." "
So we find the courts drifting off into somewhat vague dissertations
upon the election of remedies,47 though the problem actually is one of
res judicata. Or we find them making ill-defined exceptions in cases
where some items comprising the cause of action have been omitted
from the earlier action through ignorance, mistake or fraud. 3 Or, in
line with the general principle that the government, unlike a private
litigant, should not be prejudiced by the lack of skill of its own attor-
neys, the courts may refuse to apply the rule against splitting causes
of action in litigation brought by the state, or "involving the public
interest." 41 Most of these cases seem to arrive at a desirable result,
but the effort has been inartistic, to say the least. It is believed that
the suggestions contained herein would make these cases somewhat
more cohesive and would furnish them a more convincing rationale by
bringing them within a general workable rule rather than leaving them
as exceptions to a rule which at its best is not very satisfactory.
Many, if not most, res judicata cases are the result of a procedural
error on the part of counsel. Each case should be decided with reference
to the basic objects of the rule rather than by highly conceptual theo-
ries of what is a cause of action. If the subject matter of the second
action is so inextricably involved with that of the first case that it must
44. 159 F2d 489 (C.C.A. 5th 1947).
45. Id. at 492.
46. See note 8 smpra.
47. Norwood v. McDonald, 142 Ohio St. 299, 52 N.E2d 67 (1943).
48. See Note, 142 A.L.R. 905 (1943).
49. United States v. Pan-American Petroleum Co., 55 F2d 753 (C.C.A. 9th 1932)
(suit to cancel fraudulent oil leases made under Secretary Fall) ; Vhite v. Adler, 289
N.Y. -34, 43 N.E2d 798 (1942) (suit to recover bank stockholder's liability); State v.
Superior Court, 145 Wash. 576, 261 Pac. 110 (1927) (eminent domain case in vhich the
court points out that in any event the entire expense of the proceeding is borne by
petitioner).
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have entered into the composition of the first judgment then further
consideration should be barred by res judicata. If the matter might
more economically and conveniently have been litigated in the first
action but in fact was not, then costs and expensea should be assessed
against the offending party. This would seem to let the punishment
fit the crime.
